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In 189^ Freud differentiated paranoid from nonparanoid
schizophrenics by comparing their major defenses. From
clinical data he identified the major defense of the non-
paranoid schizophrenic as repression and that of the para-
noid as projection. In the 80 years which have followed,
numerous and somet imes conflicting differences between para-
noid and nonparanoid schizophrenics have also been observed
on a variety of laboratory measures. Magaro (197*0 has pro-
posed a theory to account for these multiple differences.
He states that it is the failure to understand the impact of
multiple variables , such as drive
,
perception, cognition,
and attention , which Is respons ible for the consistent find-
ing of a schizophrenic deficit and the persistent, conflict-
ing results in research. He concludes that multiple, com-
plex psychological processes are required even in completing
a simple task, and that it is the inability to Integrate
these processes, rather than the effect of any single vari-
able, that is responsible for the deficit.
Integration Theory
The work to be reported will test the integration
theory of schizophrenia proposed by Magaro (197*0: Magaro,
Miller, & McDowell, 1975; McDowell, Reynolds, & Magaro,
1975). The 'theory contends that the schizophrenic perform-
ance deficit is the result of an inability to Integrate a
2variety of cognitive and perceptual functions in problem
solving situations. According to integration theory, cogni-
tion and perception cannot function independently since a
combination of these two processes is required for satisfac-
tory performance on most tasks. Their reciprocal, correct-
ive influence on one another is crucial to successful task
performance. In normals cognition and perception function
as integrated processes with their specific equilibrium be-
ing both situationally and development ally determined
.
Schizophrenic s emphasizing only one of these two basic pro-
cesses will be defic ient in both everyday living situat ions
and most laboratory tasks where the integration of cognitive
and perceptual processes is necessary. Magar o further sug-
gests that the impaired capacity for integration results in
separate resolutions which differentiate paranoid and non-
paranoid schizophrenic subgroups . The paranoid resolves the
integration deficit by relying on cognitive processes which,
because they are poorly integrated with perceptual processes,
are not modified or refined by data from the environment.
The paranoid processes data by forcing or distorting per-
cepts into existing cognitive structures. Nonparanoids re-
solve the problem by relying on perceptual data which are
not related to former patterns, events, or logical schemes
of organization.
Other theorists have also emphasized the importance of
the reciprocal influence of cognition and perception. ?ia-
get (1952) and Werner (1948) have been clear in their con-
tentions that an integration between the individual's per-
ceptions of the world and his internal cognitive structure
by which perceptions are organized, is important for ade-
quate adaptation. To generate a developmental model of
schizophrenia, Magaro draws a rough parallel between Pia-
get's dialectic processes of assimilation and accomodation
and the integration of conceptual and perceptual systems:
We propose that Piaget's theory of adaptation, in
which the dialectic processes of assimilation and
accomodation produce equilibrium at successively-
higher levels of schema-complexity , is translatable
to a theory of integration of conceptual and per-
ceptual systems
.
Plavell (1963) sees assimilation rising from
"the fact that every cognitive encounter with an
environmental object necessarily involves some
kind of cognitive structuring (or restructuring)
of that object in accord with the nature of the or-
ganism T s existing intellectual organ! zat ion TT (p .
48 ) . That is , assimilation involves the fitting
of perceptions into existing schemas (cognitive
structures). This may do some violence to what we
call objective reality, e.g., the' thumb and breast
are different objects, but when both are assimi-
lated in the sucking* schema the perceptions of
each are assigned to a single cognitive structure.
Thus , in our terms, assimilation is a largely per-
ceptual process, a process permitting the assign-
ment of data to an existing cognitive structure.
Accomodation, on the other hand
,
is "the process
of adapting oneself to the variegated requirements
or demands which the world of objects imposes upon
one . In even the most elementary cognition, there
has to be some coming to grips with the special
properties of the thing apprehended" (Flavell, p.
48). Accomodation thus refers to a cognitive pro-
cess in which cognitive structures are modified to
better fit the data of perception. Piaget's equi-
librium of these two "processes which regulate
themselves by a progressive compensation of sys-
tems" is in our model the integration of perceptual
and cognitive processes 11 (Magaro, 1975 , p 109-
110).
Magaro suggests that the failure to achieve equilibrium of
conceptual and perceptual systems at
.
progressively higher •
stages of development as being responsible in turn for au-
tism, two types of childhood schizophrenia, and adult para-
noid and nonparanoid schizophrenia.
In childhood autism psychic development is arrested at
stage four of Piaget T s sensori-motor period (8-12 months)
which is operationally defined as the "coordination of sec-
ondary schema and their application to new situations" (Fla-
vell, 1963). At this stage of development the normal infant
begins to differentiate between assimilation (perception)
and accomodation (cognition) by combining the common ele-
ments of separate sensori-motor action patterns to form new,
accomo dative obj ect schema s . An ob 3 ect present in several
motor schemas emerges as distinct from' specific patterns of
act ion . In the autistic child this transition does not oc-
cur; objects do not become separate from his/her action with
them. The autistic child does not separate assimilation
from accomodation, perceptual from cognitive processes, self
from ob j ec t
.
While the autistic child never achieves the first step
toward integration, the schizophrenic child achieves this
differentiation in a relatively normal fashion, attaining
object constancy and self-object differentiation. S/he then
5enters what Piaget calls the "pre-operational" period of
ages (2-4 years of age), which is identified by the child's
capacity for representational thought. This period involves
its own form of disequilibrium and requires a new integra-
tion of perceptual (assimilation) and cognitive (accomoda-
tion; processes. The resolution of this second period of
disequilibrium may be achieved in one of three ways. First,
the child may achieve the normal integrative resolution be-
tween perception and cognition, assimilation and accomoda-
tion in Piagetian terms. In this case cognition and percep-
tion continually operate in an integrated fashion with per-
ception modifying cognitive structures and cognitive struc-
tures organizing perceptual processes.
The second mode of resolution during this period takes
the form of emphasizing accomodation (cognition) over assi-
milation (perception), that is the uniqueness of perceptions
rather than their similarity. In this- ,;perceptual" resolu-
tion, the
. . .child continually alters his concepts to fit
immediate perceptions. The influx of perception
is not ordered by cognition; rather, cognitive
structures vary with each perception. In Piaget'
s
terms the child has a dominance of accomodation.
This resolution corresponds well with descriptions
of the majority of childhood schizophrenics. The
child has symbols, language, and a primitive no-
tion of the other, but has not developed the stable
'secondary schemas ' necessary to integrate these
percepts with a stable representation of the world.
Integration is fleeting at best, and perception
dominates cognition, constructing them dissolving
schemas as new elements are apprehended. Thus both
6perceptions and cognitions appear distorted, fan
tasized. We call this perceptual resolution
T childhood schizophrenia, oerceptual type T
Magaro, 1975, p. 129-130).
The third type of resolution during this period empha-
sizes assimilation (perception) over accomodation (cogni-
tion) . This is referred to by Magaro as a "conceptual re-
solution" (p. 130).
The child with a conceptual resolution develops a
few connections between concepts. But these con-
nections are tenuous and unstable and therefore
threatened by discrepant percepts
. The child main-
tains these emergent cognitive structures by disre-
garding or distorting perceptual influence. He
continues to differentiate and develop his con-
cepts, but their relation to perceptual reality is
less than normal . He disregards perceptual data
in order to retain the validity and stability of
his concepts. In Piaget T s terms, assimilation is
dominant .... We call this type of resolution
T childhood schizophrenia
,
cognitive type 1 (Magaro
,
1975, p. 13D.
There is also a third period of disequilibrium de-
scribed by Piaget. It is this period of disequilibrium,
occuring in early adolescence (about 11-12 years of age),
which exacerbates previously inadequate integration, and
results in the syndromes of paranoid and nonparanoid schizo-
phrenia. For the child who adopted a perceptual resolution
(accomodation over assimilation) during the second period of
disequilibrium the transition to formal operations will be
marked by his falling progressively further behind, and more
isolated' from his peers. He will appear more and more unus-
7ual until he is finally labelled "schizophrenic." The child
whose preoperational resolution was cognitive (assimilation
over accomodation)
,
however, will meet the transition to
formal operations with some eagerness. For a period of time
he may even attract peers seeking to emulate his capacity
for abstraction. Without an adequate perceptual base, how-
ever, these concepts will become progressively more and more
isolated from reality until they are so discrepant that he
is diagnosed a "paranoid schizophrenic."
In conclusion, integration theory has been applied to
autism, childhood schizophrenia and adult paranoid and non-
paranoid schizophrenia. In each of these cases the inabil-
ity to integrate perceptual and cognitive processes is seen
as the etiological agent . Failure to achieve an integrative
resolution at one of the three periods of normal disequili-
brium disrupts further psychological development.' The vari-
ous clinical syndromes are distinguished by both the period
of disequilibrium and the type of nonintegrat ive resolution
adopted. Autism is seen as a failure to make the first step
in differentiating perception and cognition normally occur-
ing between eight and twelve months. Childhood schizophre-
nia is the result of a failure to make an integrative reso-
lution during the second period of disequilibrium which us-
ually occurs between ages two and four. The two types of
nonintegrat ive resolutions
—
perceptual and cognitive—result
in one of two hypothetical subgroups of childhood schizophre-
nia. Failure during the third period of disequilibrium,
which occurs during early adolescence, is seen as exacerbat-
ing the inadequate integration made during the second period
and resulting in either paranoid or nonparanoid schizophre-
nia .
Related Theory and Research
The integration of cognition and perception has also
been considered by other theorists as a basic requirement
for adaption. Carni (1969, 1973) in his theory of symbolic
transformations states that the ratio of cognitive and per-
ceptual processes gradually increases with development and
that this shift is slowed or attenuated in schizophrenia.
Carni, however, does not distinguish between schizophrenic
subgroups. The same general point has more recently been
made by Liebowitz (197*0 in demonstrating that the influence
of retinal image declines with age as the result of the in-
creased strength of the central, cognitive processing mech-
anisms. Feffer (1967), using Piaget's (1950) concept of ma-
ture reasoning, which involves the subordination of percep-
tual sensory impressions into cognitive categories, contends
that if these two processes are not integrated there is "a
lack of reciprocal influence between different aspects of
experience or, at a more formal level, lack of contact be-
tween systems of functioning" (Feffer, 1967, p. 18). The
characteristic schizophrenic symptoms which appear are ei-
ther manifestations of associations not tied to perceptions,
or perceptions not grouped into conceptual categories.
This is similar to the perceptual and cognitive resolutions
earlier described in relation to childhood schizophrenia.
There is also a body of evidence supporting the inte-
gration theory interpretation of perceptual and cognitive
processes differentiating different types of schizophrenia.
Ornitz (1969) in reviewing neurophy siologic studies suggests
that "the breakdown in perceptual modulation proceeds in the
direction of excessive inhibition in one type of schizophre-
nia and deficient inhibition in another" (p. 662). In terms
of integration theory , the "excessive inhibition" refers to
the paranoid's emphasis on cognitive processes to the rela-
tive exclusion of perception; "deficient inhibition" refers
to the nonparanoid emphasis on perception to the relative
exclusion of conceptual processes.
Clinically, Bowers (197*0 contrasts the phenomenology
of paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenia, suggesting that
paranoids are characterized by "irrefutable cognitive ex-
perience" and nonparanoids by the destructuring of percep-
tion and affect (p. 179-l8l). Regarding the nonparanoid,
Sarbin, Juhasz, and Todd (1971) instructed schizophrenics
and normal subjects to identify an odor where there was none.
Schizophrenics were more accurate than normals in judging
no odor present; they did not form a strong expectation or
or set. While no subgroup information is presented, these
10
results are consistent with those integration theory would
predict for the nonparanoid who is hypothesized to be more
perceptual and less affected by cognitive expectations than
the paranoid would be. Snyder, Rosenthal, and Taylor (1961)
found that schizophrenics were more accurate than normals in
reproducing unclosed circles, whereas normals made the usual
closure response.
From the Russian literature, Polyakov ( 1969 ) reported
on a series of studies which showed superior schizophrenic
performance when tasks required the use of low probability
images or associations. When required to use high proba-
bility, more common associations, the schizophrenic does
worse than the normal. Here again, the schizophrenic is
superior when the task requires a lack of conceptual frame-
work; that is when strong expectations, which are the pro-
duct of a rigid conceptual framework, hinder performance.
Regarding paranoid behavior, McReynolds, Collins, and
Acker (1964), using the McGill Closure Test, found that de-
lusional schizophrenics attempted to identify more pictures,
and identified more pictures correctly, than nondelusional
schizophrenics, thus supporting their hypothesis that the
former "have a stronger tendency to organize ambiguous sti-
muli in a meaningful way" (p. 211-212). This seems to be an
example of what Bowers (197*0 calls the "press for meaning"
and Cameron -(19^7) describes as the "sudden clarification"
of the paranoid. Abrams, Taintor and Lhamon (1966) build
on
11
McReynolds' theory and offer a cogent explanation of para
noid cognitive strategy:
In the face of new experiences, a perceiver
has the option of formulating new hypotheses to
assimilate them or leaving them unexplained pend-
ing the collection of more data, i.e., suspending
judgment. The tendency to take the latter" option,
when circumstances permit, is commonly called
open-mindedness or tolerance of ambiguity. It is
a thesis of this study, following McReynolds, that
paranoid individuals find it difficult to be open-
minded or tolerant of ambiguity. Confronted with
a large quantity of anxiety-provoking percepts,
the products of his hypervigilenc e , the paranoid
has developed a strategy of urgently forming as-
similatory hypotheses (pp. 419-420).
Operationalizing assimilation much the same as McRey-
nolds did, Abroms et aJL. found that in a task in which judg-
ment must be based on incomplete data (Street Gestalt Com-
pletion Figures), paranoids tended to form atypical and in-
correct judgments rather than none at all. The hypothesis
that the "assimilation tendency" increases with severity of
paranoid symptoms was not supported although the results
were in the predicted direction. The authors interpret
their results as suggesting that:
.the paranoid operates with the metahypothesis
that', to process his experience, it is preferable
to form an incorrect hypothesis than none at all.
Furthermore, the greater the degree of paranoid
severity, the stronger the metahypothesis (p. 495).
This "metahypothesis," in integration theory terms, is the
cognitive compensation for difficulty in integration.
12
Young and Jerome (1972), in a task which required the
solution of a series of conceptual problems in which rele-
vant cues were varied, found that paranoids consistently
performed less efficiently than nonparanoids following cue
changes. They concluded that paranoids conceptualized the
task too rigidly to permit efficient adjustment to context-
ual variation. It appears that this task was sensitive to
the paranoid cognitive emphasis. Their task was constructed
so that relatively inflexible expectations impaired perform-
ance .
A direct investigation of Integration theory has shown
mixed results. McDowell, Reynolds, and Magaro (1975), using
single-word, high- and low-probability sentence endings at
five signal-t o-noise ratios, reported that paranoids iden-
tified high-probability sentence endings more accurately
than nonparanoids; while nonparanoids tended to be more ac-
curate in identifying low probability sentence endings at
higher signal-to-noise ratios. The results of this investi-
gation support the contention that paranoids are more suc-
cessful where cognitive processes facilitate task perform-
ance and offered some support for the contention that non-
paranoids are more successful where perceptual processes re-
sult in improved performance.
In conclusion, integration theory has been conceptually
related to P'iaget 1 s (1952) developmental concepts of assim-
ilation and accomodation through which theoretical concept
13
tuallzations of autism, cognitive and perceptual forms of
childhood schizophrenia, and finally paranoid and nonpara-
noid schizophrenia were developed. The views of other the-
orists who have considered perceptual and cognitive proces-
ses to be of central importance to schizophrenic performance
(Carni, 1969, 1972; Feffer, 1967; Ornitz, 1969; Bowers,
197*0 were also considered. Related research suggests an
integration type deficit (Magaro, 197*0, but lacks direct
specificity to the integration concept (McReynolds, Collins,
& Acker, 1964; Young & Jerome, 1972) and at times is nonspe-
cific with regard to the schizophrenic subgroup being ex-
amined (Polyakov, 1969; Snyder, Rosenthal, & Taylor, 1961).
Direct investigations of the integration concept have of-
fered only partial support (McDowell, Reynolds, & Magaro,
1975; Reynolds & Magaro, 1976, in preparation). In both of
these studies, difficulty was experienced operat ionalizing
tasks with both the specificity and the tested validity re-
quired to directly assess the hypothesized cognitive and
perceptual elements of the two schizophrenic subgroups. The
present, investigation seeks to overcome that difficulty by
utilizing a heart rate measure which has been shown to di-
rectly reflect cognitive and perceptual processes both as
organismic component and task variable.
Heart Rate
Lacev and Lacey (1958, 1963, 1967) have proposed
and
14
tested a theory which states that attentive observation of
the environment, i.e., environmental intake or perceptual
activity, is accompanied by a deceleration in heart rate.
Situations which require mental or cognitive work, rejection
of the environment, produce heart rate acceleration. In
their original work the Laceys used eight tasks: 1) making
up meaningful "sentences" in which each of the words had to
begin with the same letter; 2) solving "arithmetic" prob-
lems; 3) performing a reverse "spelling" task; 4) noting and
detecting varying colors and patterns of lights ("flash");
5) listening to, and empathizing with, the affect presented
in a tape recorded recitation of the thoughts and feelings
of a dying man ("drama"); 6) playing white "noise" at lOOdb
with instructions to note and detect environmental input; 7)
listening to tape recorded "rules" for a fictitious game in
»
which subjects expected to be questioned as a test of their
intelligence ("rules of the game"); 8) taking part in a
"cold" pressure test. While each of the first three tasks
differed in its formal task requirements, all required the
internal manipulation of symbols and the retrieval of stored
information. Each of the first three tasks resulted in car-
diac accelerations. In conditions four, five and six, where
task requirements were simply to note and detect environ-
mental inputs without demands for cognitive elaboration
or
the manipulation and retrieval of information, heart
rate
tended to be driven below resting levels. Task
seven was
15
created to require both intake and cognitive elaboration.
The demand characteristic of the task required subjects to
pay close attention to incoming stimuli and to resort to
activities involving cognitive elaboration, such as the
storage, retrieval and recombination of information. The
hypothesis that heart rate would assume a function inter-
mediate between the more purely cognitive and perceptual
conditions was supported for both groups tested in this con-
dition. In one group heart rate did not change at all from
alert to stress periods and in a second group there was a
slight deceleration but this was not nearly as great as in
the straight environmental intake situations. This seventh
condition indicates that heart rate reflects, not only di-
rect cognitive and perceptual activity, but Intermediate
functions as well where some integrated use of conceptual
and perceptual activity is required. The final task, "cold"
pressor, resulted in increases in heart rate. The Laceys
speculate that the reason for this increase is to facilitate
"rejection" of painful stimuli.
Clearly, there are similarities and differences in each
of these task conditions. The conditions that resulted in
cardiac deceleration all required the subject to behave per-
ceptually—to simply note and detect incoming stimuli. These
tasks do differ among themselves however, in terms of
the
modality of sensory input ("noise" and -flash"),
in their
appeal to emotional and empathetic participation
("rules"
16
and "drama"), and in their symbolic and semantic complexity
("noise" and "flash" vs. "drama" and "rules"). In compari-
son to the perceptual tasks, those conditions which produced
cardiac accelerations all have in common the element of men-
tal or cognitive work requiring the manipulation of two
symbolic modes—words and numbers.
On the basis of these data, it is hypothesized that
cognitive behavior is accompanied by cardiac acceleration
while perceptual behavior is accompanied by cardiac decel-
eration .
Further support for the Lacey hypothesis has come from
a number of experimental laboratories and a variety of tasks
Obrist (1963) reported a replication and extension of the
major results reported by the Laceys, finding depression in
cardiovascular activity for tasks which involved attention
to the environment and acceleration in cardiovascular activ-
ity for both conceptual task and noxious stimuli . Baylock
(1972) similarly found that simply observing flashing lights
produced decreases in heart rate while a subtraction task
resulted in heart rate acceleration.
In a task designed 'to investigate response requirements
and directional fractionation of autonomic response, Hare
(1972) had a group of male subjects rate slides of homicide
victims by pressing one of seven buttons; another group sim-
ply viewed the slides; and a third group viewed the slides
and pressed a button but without the requirement to rate the
17
slides. Results showed cardiovascular deceleration for the
nonraters and cardiovascular acceleration for the raters.
The heart rate responses of the button-pressing nonraters
were almost identical with those of the nonraters who sim-
ply viewed the slides. These results are consistent with
the hypothesis that the requirement to rate the stimuli is
associated with "cognitive" elaboration while the require-
ment to passively observe, or to observe and simply respond
in a fashion that does not require cognitive activity, is
associated with cardiac deceleration.
In two other investigations from the same laboratory,
Hare and his associates (Hare, Wood, Britain, & Prazelle,
1971; Hare, Wood, Britain, & Shadman, 1971) found that both
males and females showed significant cardiac deceleration
while viewing affective visual stimuli including homicide
scenes, nude females and slides of ordinary objects. There
were no overall differences in the magnitude of cardiac de-
celeration between sexes, although there were several dif-
ferences in the type of slides eliciting the largest re-
sponse. For males the largest cardiac response was elicited
by the homicide slides while the largest vasomotor and elec-
trodermal responses were elicited by the nude slides. For
women this was reversed.
Other investigators (Porges & Raskin, 1969), studying
heart rate and respiratory components of attentive observa-
tion to internal stimuli (subject was required to estimate
18
his own heart rate), as well as external stimuli, found that
heart rate accelerated for internal observation and decel-
erated for external observation
.
In a direct investigation of cardiac acceleration dur-
ing mental activity, Blatt (1961) divided subjects into ef-
ficient vs. inefficient problem solvers. His results indi-
cate a highly significant increase in heart rate for effi-
cient subjects during attempts to solve problems. Further,
these increases were significantly greater than their own
resting baseline and at the same time significantly greater
than the changes in cardiac patterns of inefficient subjects
In a pair of experiments, Obrist, Webb, Sutterer and
Howard (1970) and Webb and Obrist (1970) investigated car-
diac response to a two second preparatory interval presented
regularly (Webb & Obrist, 1970) and irregularly (Obrist et_
*
al. , 1970). They conclude that:
. .
.both the direction and magnitude of the car-
diac change is a function of what the organism is
doing somatically to prepare for the behavioral
response. . .cardiac and somatic effects have been
observed to be concomitant in that a 2 second PI
presented in a predictable manner, i.e., regular
series, results in greater decreases in cardiac
and somatic effects (Webb and Obrist, i970) than
a two second PI presented irregularly as in the
present experiment (p.
Here the regular presentation of a simple fixed interval
re-
action time task produces cardiac deceleration as in
other
tasks reported which required simple perceptual
functioning;
19
whereas heart rate to the same length PI presented in an ir-
regular series was higher indicating increased cognitive re-
quirements of the task. These investigators further report
that in all preparatory intervals in. excess of 2 seconds (4,
8 and 16 seconds) 16 out of 21 subjects show decreases in
heart rate. At the two second interval both regular groups
(ascending and decending fixed interval series) show signif-
icant declines; whereas for the irregular group only 8 of
21 subjects show significant deceleration in heart rate.'
They also note that beyond the 2 second interval the group .
receiving the fixed interval, ascending series, showed
roughly two times the deceleration of the variable interval
group
.
Another investigation (Andressi, Rapisardi, & Whalen,
1969) also found heart rate significantly higher with a va-
riable interval series (11-22 second intervals) than with a
fixed interval series (30 second interval). These investi-
gators conclude
:
Lacey et al. (1963) present evidence that tasks
involving cognitive funct ioning are accompanied by
increases in HR while those emphasizing perceptual
functioning are accompanied by HR decreases. In
the present investigation all Ss expressed an ef-
fort to "figure out" the uncertain VI signal pat-
tern and HR increases occurred, as would be pre-
dicted by Lacey and his colleagues for cognitive
type tasks, and, even though the present study
could come under the heading of a human operant
conditioning paradigm, it is apparent that the
cognitive aspects under VI cannot be dismissed.
The performance of SS under PI demanded constant
attention to external stimuli , but did not involve
20
cognitive activity in the same sense as was re-
uired under VI since the signal pattern was regu-lar and known. Thus, HR was lower under PI sinceperceptual functioning was primarily involved a
result it seems fair to say, which would be pre-dicted by Lacey and associates (p.
These three investigations (Obrist et al., 1970; Webb
& Obrist, 1970; Andressi et al.
, 1969) all report relative
increases in heart rate with variable interval reaction time
tasks. These data together with investigations presented
earlier which more clearly defined cognitive and perceptual
task requirements, and the statements of Andressi e_t al . '
s
subjects who tried to "figure out" the uncertain variable
interval, argues for the presence of a cognitive element in
variable Interval tasks which is absent In simple fixed in-
terval tasks.
Evidence for the ability of heart rate to differentiate
individual differences in cognitive and perceptual response
styles is provided by the work of Israel (1969). In her in-
vestigations with normal, white, male undergraduates, sub-
jects were classified as either levelers or sharpeners on
the basis of a laboratory perceptual test (Schematizing
Test). Sharpeners are defined as individuals whose charac-
teristic style of behavior is to be attentive to all types
of external detail. They tend to pay attention to every-
thing to focus on differences rather than on similarities
between stimuli. Levelers, on the other hani , make global
judgments and are inattentive to environmental details. As
21
predicted by Israel the heart rate deceleration of sharpen-
ers was greater than that of levelers. Both groups decel-
erated, but sharpeners— the individuals acutely aware of and
attentive to external environmental details—evidenced about
the same magnitude of deceleration no matter what the sti-
muli. The sharpener was equally attentive to everything,
and this was mirrored by cardiac deceleration of approxi-
mately the same degree to all stimuli—low-preferred, high-
preferred or. anxiety producing. Levelers, in contrast, did
not decelerate as much, and the actual magnitude of the car-
diac deceleration in anticipation of the visual stimuli did
depend upon whether it was low-preferred, high-preferred, or
anxiety producing stimuli.
Concluding Remarks and Hypotheses
In summary, it appears that both task conditions and
organismic variables influence the direction and magnitude
of cardiac acceleration and deceleration and in the process
reflect the predominance of cognitive or perceptual behav-
ior. This conclusion is important to the present investi-
gation which will study the characteristic styles of para-
noid and nonparanoid schizophrenics on a variety of fixed
and variable interval reaction time tasks. Integration the-
ory would predict that the heart rate of paranoids would re-
flect a more cognitive orientation while that of nonpara-
noids would be more perceptual. The tasks in the present
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experiment were chosen for their ability to vary in cogni-
tive and perceptual requirements. The simple, short, fixed
interval trials draw more on perceptual processes; the more
complex, variable interval trials draw more on cognitive •
processes (Andressi et al
. , 1969; Obrist et al.
,
1970; Webb
& Obrist, 1970). These same hypothesized perceptual and
cognitive processes are seen as organismic or characteris-
tic dispositional styles of nonparanoid and paranoid schizo-
phrenics respectively. Task requirements can be expected to
augment these processes.
On the tasks in the present investigation it is hypo-
thesized :
1) Paranoid schizophrenics will behave more like con-
trol subjects on variable interval tasks (3 and
5). Nonparanoid schizophrenics will behave more
like controls on fixed interval conditions (1, 2,
and 4). In condition 6, a 5 second fixed period
interval condition, a 25 watt green light was added
to increase the intensity, observability and there-
by perceptual element of the task. This dimension
was added to determine if this would facilitate
perceptual functioning, primarily that of the non-
paranoid schizophrenic. Perceptual functioning
should be greater for nonparanoids in this over
other fixed interval conditions.
2) Overall conditions paranoid schizophrenics will re-
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fleet a more accelerative heart rate function rela-
tive to nonparanoid schizophrenics and control sub-
jects, while nonparanoid schizophrenics will re-
flect a greater decelerative function relative to-
paranoid schizophrenics and control subjects.
3) Controls' heart rate should show greater decelera-
tion on fixed than on variable interval conditions.
METHOD
Subjects
Subjects, all male, were seven acute paranoid, seven
acute nonparanoid, and seven hospitalized, nonpsychotic con-
trols. Criteria for inclusion in the subject groups were
eight months or less current hospitalization ; two years or
less total hospitalization; age between 18 and 60 ; no evi-
dence of organicity or retardation and a hospital diagnosis
of either paranoid schi zophrenia
,
nonparanoid schizophrenia
,
or nonpsychotic personality disorder.
Subjects were identified by searching the state hospit-
al inpatient records and through cooperation of the hospital
admission staff. Groups were comprised of the first seven
subjects who agreed to participate in the study and whose
subdiagnosis was confirmed by Vojtisek's (1975) modification
of a scale developed by Venables and O'Connor (1959). No
subiects were eliminated because of conflicting diagnosis.
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One subject refused to participate.
The scale used (Appendix I) contains ten bipolar symp-
tom ratings. The five paranoid items are from Venables and
O'Connor's (1959) paranoid subscale, • and four of the nonpara-
noid items are from the nonparanoid subscale of Overall and
Gorham (1962). A time disorientation item was added to the
nonparanoid scale (Vojtisek, 1975). Each item may be scored
from 1 (no symptom) to 5 (spontaneous, strong expression).
Paranoid symptoms rated were suspicion of control or influ-
ence; suspicion of persecution or conspiracy; exaggerated
opinion of ability, status, power, wealth, or knowledge;
ideas of reference; and hostility. Nonparanoid symptoms
rated were auditory and visual hallucinations; verbal inco-
herence; emotional incongruity; time disorientation (season,
month, year, day of week, and time in hospital); and bizarre
motor behavior. Summing scores for each set of items yields
paranoid and nonparanoid symptom scores. All subjects were
rated for symptoms by the author in a 10-15 minute, semidi-
rective interview. Since no cases were eliminated because
of conflicting diagnosis, all cases were "pure" as suggested
by Shakow (1969) •
Both scales from which items were drawn report adequate
reliability. Scale diagnosis agreed with hospital diagnosis
for all of the subjects tested.' Validity of the current
scale has been investigated by Vohtisek (1975) and
Gripp
(1975). Vojtisek found that scale-diagnosed nonparanoids
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were significantly more confused on the expanded similari-
ties test (Hamlin & Lorr, 1971) than either paranoids or
controls, who did not differ. Gripp found a correlation of
-.66 (n = 21; p < .01) between nonparanoid symptom scores
and scores on the expanded similarities for a group of hos-
pitalized psychotics. Paranoid scores correlated only -.12,
as expected. Likewise, nonparanoid scores correlated
.39
(n = .21; p < .05) with Embedded Figures Test scores, but
paranoid scores correlated only .08. Also, nonparanoid
scores correlated .44 (n = 21; p < .05) with reaction time,
but paranoid scores correlated only .06. A significant cor-
relation between paranoid scale scores and type of admission
was found (r = .47; n = 21; p < .05), whereas no correlation
existed for nonparanoid score and type of admission. Those
with higher paranoid scores tended to be Involuntarily com-
mitted and those with lower paranoid scores tended to be
voluntary patients.
Symptom rating scale data on the subjects used in this
investigation are presented in Table 1. In each case Ano-
Insert Table 1 about here
vas indicate significant differences (p_ < .05) between
groups. When the nonparanoid scores are considered Duncan's
Multiple .Range Test indicates that this is due to differ-
ences between nonparanoid schizophrenics and
controls and
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between nonparanoid schizophrenics and paranoid schizophre-
nics; there were no significant differences between paranoid
schizophrenics and control subjects. When the paranoid
scores are considered Duncan's Test indicates significant
differences between paranoid schizophrenics and controls and
between paranoid schizophrenics and nonparanoid schizophre-
nics; there were no differences observed between controls
and nonparanoid schizophrenics.
Table 2 summarizes other descriptive subject character-
Insert Table 2 about here
istics. There were no significant differences between the
groups in age, number of admissions, weeks in hospital, or
marital status. There were significant differences in tne
amount of medication received in mg/day chloropromazine equi-
valent (Hollister, 1973), P(2,l8) = 3.75, p < .05. Duncan's
Multiple Range Test indicates that nonparanoid schizophre-
nics were receiving significantly more medication than con-
trols (p < .05). There were no differences between paranoid
and nonparanoid schizophrenics or between paranoid schizo-
phrenics and control subjects.
Stimuli
A yellow and a green jewel light both 1/2 inch in dia-
meter, served as warning signal and reaction time signal,
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respectively. The lights were placed 13 inches apart (warn-
ing signal on the left and reaction time light on the right)
in -the middle of a 21 x 2 3 inch stimulus box located three
feet in front of the subject's chair. A series of four red
lights of the same size and type as the warning and reaction
time lights were placed 7-1/2 inches above and at 2-1/2 inch
intervals between the warning and reaction time lights. A
7 x 6-1/4 inch wide frosted glass window with a 25 watt
green bulb behind it was located between the warning and
reaction time signals. The unlit bulb could not be seen by
the subject
.
Procedure and Apparatus
Upon entering the experimental room subjects were seat-
ed in a large comfortable arm chair and administered the
symptom rating scale. Arm and leg leads were then attached
in the standard fashion while their function was explained.
One cup-type electrode was taped on the ventral side of the
upper right forearm and another was similarly located on the
left forearm. The third electrode, a grounding plate, was
attached to the inside of the right ankle. Heart rate was
recorded continuously on a Narco-Biosy stems Physiograph
(Model DMP-4A ) and Biotachomet er (Model BT-1200) including
associated accessory and preamplifier units. After the
leads were attached and functioning, a board was placed
across the arms of the chair with a standard telegraph- key
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placed to the right or left depending on which hand the '
subject preferred. The instructions were then read to the
subject explaining the stimulus board and telling him that
his job was to press the telegraph key as quickly as possi-
ble when the green light came on. Subjects were told that
the yellow light (warning signal) would precede the green
light (reaction time signal) and that this was a signal that
the green light would be coming on soon. Concerning the red
lights, subjects were only told that they would be going on
and off through various conditions during the trials and
that 'When this happened their job was still to press down
the key as quickly as possible when the green lights came
on. No instructions beyond this were given regarding the
red lights (see Appendix II). After the directions were
read, isolation headphones were placed on the subject and
lov; level white noise was produced from a Bruel and Kjoer
Noise Generator (Type 1024), recorded on a Tandberg tape re-
corder (Model 823-F), and presented through Pioneer head-
phones (Model SE-50) . Subjects were next asked to relax
for approximately three minutes while the equipment was be-
ing readied. All subjects were continually monitored via
closed circuit television. Subjects were told via the head-
phones, by the experimenter in an adjacent room, when the
trials would begin, and prior to the final condition that
the green light behind the frosted glass would serve as a
reaction time signal for the final condition.
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Conditions
The first 70 trials, in blocks of 14 each, were pre-
sented to the subject in the following order:
1) 5-second, fixed preparatory. interval between the
warning signal and reaction time signal;
2) 3-second, fixed preparatory interval trials;
3) 4-, 5-, and 6-second variable preparatory interval
between one warning signal and reaction time signal
with interval lengths first randomized and then
presented to every subject in the following order:
6, 5, 6, 4, 5, 5, 4, 6, 5, 4, 5, 4, 4, 5,
4) 5-second, fixed preparatory interval trials with
red sequencing lights following the warning signal
at 1, 2, 3, and 4 second intervals. The reaction
time signal followed the fourth sequencing light; by
1 second; these lights were added to further reduce
uncertainty
;
5) 4-, 5-, and 6-second variable preparatory interval
trials (interval length presentations same as con-
dition 3) with red lights following the warning
signal at 1, 2, 3, and 4 seconds. The reaction
time signal came on concurrently with. the fourth
light in the 4-second interval; following the
fourth sequencing light by 1 second in the 5-second
.interval and by 2 seconds in the 6-second interval.
These red lights were maintained during this inter-
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val to maximize uncertainty;
6) For the final 15 trials the white noise was tempor-
arily discontinued while the subjects were given
instructions via the headphones. Subjects were
.
told that a green light would now also come on be-
hind the window between the warning and reaction
time lights. They were again told that the yellow
light would warn them, just as before, that the
green lights would be coming on soon. Following
this the white noise was again turned on and 1*1
trials of 5-second fixed preparatory interval trials
were run with both the high-intensity 25 watt bulb
and jewel light acting as reaction time signals.
This additional light was added, as stated earlier,
to increase intensity, observability, and facili-
tate perceptual functioning.
All lights, in all conditions, remained on for 1 second
except for the reaction time signal which remained on either
until the telegraph key was pressed or for 2 seconds after
which subjects were alerted to respond. A total of 84
trials were presented. The entire task lasted approximately
22 minutes, dependent on the length of the subject's reac-
tion times. Reaction times were recorded from a Standard
Timer
.
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RESULTS
Heart rate was recorded continuously in beats per min-
ute from the onset of condition one until the end of the
final condition. From these data a trial basal was obtained
by averaging the final two seconds of the 10-second inter-
trial-interval between the preceding reaction time signal
and the forthcoming warning signal. Heart rate at warning
signal and reation time signal was taken directly from the
point of warning and reaction time signal within each sub-
ject's continuous record. These were both single readings
rather than the averaged readings used to establish a trial
basal level because the Intent was to establish heart rate
during particular events in a process. Each subject's heart
rate at trial basal, warning signal and reaction time signal
was evaluated using a four-way groups x conditions x blocks
(i.e., trial basal, warning signal, reaction time signal) x
trials repeated measures analysis of variance. (ANCOVA was
not significant, p < .46, indicating medication differences
were not influential.) For ease of exposition, and as major
findings are not affected, only three-way AIIOVA results are
presented. Table 3 contains the results of this analysis.
Insert Table 3 about here
For the purpose of graphing these data, difference scores
(difference in absolute heart rate from trial basal to warn-
ing signal and from warning signal to reaction time signal)
were used to more clearly show the relationship between
group heart rate functions. The absolute values are pre-
sented in the graphs.
As is indicated in Table 3 the main effect of Condi-
tions and the interaction effect of Conditions x Blocks x
Groups were both highly significant; the interaction ef-
fects of Conditions x Groups and Conditions x Bocks are both
marginally significant; and the main effects for Groups,
Blocks and the interaction effects of Blocks x Groups are
not significant. Prom these results it is clear that Condi-
tions figures predominantly in all of the highly significant
and marginally significant results whereas it is not present
in the nonsignificant results. The findings bearing on the
Integration Theory hypotheses are as follows: 1) Paranoid
schizophrenics will behave more like control subjects on
variable interval tasks (3 and 5). Nonparanoid schizophre-
nics will behave more like controls on fixed interval condi-
tions (1, 2 and 4)
.
The effect of major interest to this hypothesis, Groups
x Conditions x Blocks, was highly significant, p < .007. In
terms of the major hypotheses, however, the results were
"mixed." As predicted, the heart rate of paranoid schizo-
phrenics reflected an accelerative function on variable in-
terval conditions CFigure 1) with controls intermediate and
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Insert Figure 1 about here
nonparanoid schizophrenics reflecting a decelerative func-
tion. However, when conditions 3 and 5 are looked at indi
vidually the hypothesis holds only for condition 3 (Figure
2). In condition 5 (Figure 3) in which lights were se-
Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here
quenced at one second intervals and the time between the
warning and reaction time signals varied (4, 5 or 6 seconds),
there were virtually no differences between either of the
experimental groups and the control group. All three groups
reflected a slightly decelerative, Intermediate function.
The parallel prediction that nonparanoid schizophrenics
would show a greater decelerative function on fixed interval
conditions was not supported. Overall" fixed interval condi-
tions (Figure H) nonparanoid schizophrenics heart rate in-
Insert Figure 4 about here
creases from warning to reaction time signal reflecting a
biased accelerative function while paranoids and control
subjects showed a decelerative function during that same
period. In condition 1 (Figure 5) and 4 (Figure 6) paranoid
schizophrenics decelerate from warning to reaction
time sig-
3^
nal to a point between controls and nonparanoids
. In condi
tion 2 (Figure 7), a short three-second fixed interval se-
Insert Figures 5, 6, and 7 .about here
ries, clear increases in nonparanoid and controls heart rate
are apparent while paranoids assume an intermediate func-
tion .
In condition 6 (Figure 8), where an additional 25 watt
Insert Figure 8 about here
green light was added to increase signal intensity, observa
bility and thereby the perceptual element of the task, non-
paranoid schizophrenics continue to show an 'accelerat ive
function, while paranoid schizophrenics decelerate very
slightly from warning to reaction time signal and control
subjects show a marked decelerative function. 2) Overall
conditions paranoid schizophrenics will reflect a more ac-
celerative heart rate function relative to nonparanoid
schizophrenics and control subjects, while nonparanoid
schizophrenics will reflect a greater decelerative function
relative to paranoid schizophrenics and control subjects.
This hypothesis, Groups x Blocks, was not confirmed (p
< .24). Overall conditions in which fixed interval outnum-
ber variable interval conditions 4 to 2, nonparanoid heart
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rate accelerates slightly, paranoid schizophrenics heart
rate decelerates slightly and controls show a marked decel-
erate function (Figure 9). Equating for number and type
of conditions (conditions 1 & 4 vs. 3 & 5) tends to bring •
both of the experimental groups closer to a median function
(i.e., no change from trial basal to warning signal to reac
tion time signal, Figure 10).
Insert Figures 9 and 10 about here
DISCUSSION
The major tenet of Integration Theory and the funda-
mental hypothesis of this investigation was that the resolu-
tion of the schizophrenic deficit is cognitive in paranoid
schizophrenia and perceptual in nonparanoid schizophrenia.
The findings failed to support this hypothesis. Although
paranoid schizophrenics' heart rate generally reflected a
cognitive function during variable interval conditions, dur-
ing fixed interval conditions their heart rate just as clear
ly reflected a perceptual function—at times more so than
controls. Likewise, while nonparanoid schizophrenics' heart
rate reflected a perceptual function on variable interval
conditions, as predicted, in contrast to predictions their
heart rate reflected a cognitive function during fixed in-
terval conditions. Finally, overall conditions nonparanoid
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schizophrenics' heart rate accelerated slightly from trial
basal to warning signal to reaction time signal while para-
noid schizophrenics showed no change and control subjects
decelerated
.
The results also establish that the operations had
their predicted effects on control subjects by indicating
controls' relatively increased function on variable interval
over fixed interval tasks and lend support to Andressi et
al
. (1969) showing a more cognitive heart rate function on
variable interval vs. fixed interval tasks. The actual in-
crease in heart rate of controls during condition 3, the
three-second fixed interval condition, was not expected but
is understandable. Obrist and his colleagues (Obrist, Webb
,
Sutterer, & Howard, 1970; Webb & Obrist, 1970) have shown
that heart rate deceleration is sharply attenuated at short-
er preparatory intervals (usually two-second) in a fixed in-
terval series with 20-25$ showing no . deceleration . This
shorter interval had the effect of increasing the heart rate
function of all groups over other fixed interval conditions.
By far the most interesting finding in this experiment
was the crossover of paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics
on variable interval and fixed interval conditions. Since
these results are both interesting and contrary to the hypo-
theses, the heart rate behavior' of each group will be looked
at by conditions before any conclusions are drawn. Immedi-
ate "explanations" for group heart rate behavior
will reflect
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that of the Lacey's; increases in heart reflects a "rejec-
tion" of the environment and cognitive activity; decreases
in heart rate reflect "intake" or attention to the environ-
ment, a perceptual behavior; intermediate functions reflect
the combined use of both processes.
Conditions Summary
Conditions 1, 4 and 6 were all predictable in terms of
their being fixed interval conditions. Condition 4 was made
more predictable than condition 1 by inserting red lights at
one second intervals between the warning signal and reaction
time signal. However, even with this added predictability
nonparanoid and paranoid schizophrenics' heart rate func-
tions are almost exactly the same between warning signal and
reaction time signal; the most noticable change is that con-
trols decelerate less in the same period. During condition
6 the direction of the functions is still the same for all
groups although the divergence between paranoid and nonpara-
noid schizophrenics' heart rate is markedly reduced. In
terms of the Lacey model, during a five-second fixed inter-
val condition nonparanoid schizophrenics tend to be more
cognitive and reject the environment whereas paranoid schi-
zophrenics and control subjects are more perceptual and at-
tentive to the environment.
In the three-second fixed interval condition the
heart
rate function of paranoid and nonparanoid
schizophrenics is
directionally the same as for the five-second fixed inter-
val conditions, only controls change direction. Again, gen
eralizing from the Lacey hypothesis, during this fixed in-
terval condition nonparanoid schizophrenics go in the direc
tion of being more cognitive and rejecting the environment,
while paranoid schizophrenics are more perceptual and atten
tive to the environment. During this shorter interval con-
trols are more like nonparanoid than paranoid schizophre-
In variable interval condition 3 the results for para-
noid and nonparanoid schizophrenics are reversed from the
fixed interval conditions
—
paranoid schizophrenics become
cognitive and reject the environment while nonparanoid
schizophrenics become perceptual and attentive to the en-
vironment. During condition 5 where confusion was added to
uncertainty by flashing lights at a regular sequence while
the intervals between the warning signal and reaction time
signal varied, all groups • reflect ed a slight perceptual
function between the warning and reaction time signal. It
would appear that the uncertainty of the variable interval
together with the confusion by an element which had just
-
signaled increased predictability can act as a powerful
force in bringing some otherwise divergent groups together.
Summary
,
Integration with Select ed Theory and Conclusions
There are points in time in their relationship
to the
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environment that the heart rate of either paranoid and/or
nonparanoid schizophrenics are direct ionally synchronous
with control subjects and times one or the other is (Asyn-
chronous with controls. This can be. seen as a disruption of
a psychophysiological rhythm (trial basal to warning signal
to reaction time signal) which depends upon the interaction
with, and relationship of the individual to a particular
state of affairs in the environment (e.g., fixed interval,
variable interval and variations of these tasks). It is
clear from this research that the situation within which
paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics are interacting is
an important factor in determining psychophysiological be-
havior and directional concordance or discordance with con-
trol subjects. Paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics
while they may have certain behavioral dispositions are not
exclusively cognitive or perceptual, or probably anything
else. How they behave depends in large part on the interac-
tion between them and the situation within which they are
responding
.
This experiment reproduced six different situations
—
variations of fixed and variable Interval reaction time
tasks—within which some aspects of the relationships be-
tween task conditions, paranoid and nonparanoid schizophre-
nics, behavior, and control subjects' behavior could be ob-
served. Generally, paranoid schizophrenics' performance
was
most like controls during fixed interval reaction
time situ-
HQ
ations. Here their heart rate, like that of control' sub-
jects, reflected more perceptual, attentive behavior. Dur-
ing a variable interval situation their heart rate reflected
cognitive behavior and a rejection of the environment. Even
during fixed interval situations, however, the magnitude of
the heart rate deceleration is not as great for paranoid
schizophrenics as it is for control subjects. Variations of
this general situation also have effects on the concordance
or the likeness between the two groups, i.e., they react
more or less alike depending on the variations of the situ-
ation.
Nonparanoid schizophrenics, on the other hand, reflect
psychophysiological behavior which is most like controls at
times when they are within a variable interval situation.
Here, their heart rate reflects more perceptual, attentive
behavior, while during fixed interval conditions their heart
rate reflects cognitive behavior and a" rejection of the en-
vironment. Here also, while they are direct ionally the same
as controls during variable interval situations, nonparanolds
and controls reflect different degrees of change.
Variations of simple fixed or variable interval situa-
tions, where time or additional elements are added to tasks,
have effects on all groups including control subjects.
While condition 2 (Figure 7) alters the psychophysiological
behavior of control subjects it does not change the behavior
of paranoid or nonparanoid schizophrenics from other fixed
interval situations. In the confusion of condition 5 (Fig-
ure 3) where there is both the uncertainty of a variable in-
terval situation and lights which are desynchronous with the
length of the interval the psychophysiological rhythm which
reflects groups' interactions with the environment hardlv
differ. Nobody looks deviant when everybody is confused.
Nonparanoid and paranoid schizophrenics also reflect
nearly Identical psychophysiological rhythms in different
kinds of situations that are mirror opposites of those us-
ually shown by control subjects. For example, see Figures
5 and 8 where nonparanoid and paranoid schizophrenics decel-
erate before accelerating. This is also apparent in the
composite variable interval and fixed interval graphs (Fig-
ure 1 and 4) where the usual pattern of increasing from
trial basal to warning signal then decelerating from warning
signal to reaction time signal is shown by control subjects.
So far the heart rate of paranoid and nonparanoid schi-
zophrenics and control subjects have been discussed in terms
of the relationship and interaction of the individual groups
within, and to, a situation, with changes in heart rate seen
as reflecting a particular mode of psychological behavior.
It has been noted that the psychophysiological rhythms for
different groups are sometimes dichotomous, i.e., paranoids
decelerating while nonparanoids accelerate. Other theorists
have also noted bipolarities (Shakow, 1977) in
paranoid and
nonparanoid behavior and opposites (Steffy &
Cromwell, 1975)
k2
in relation to control subjects. These observations were
also made in regard to behavior which occurred within a re-
action time situation. A selected review and integration
with these views should provide some, breadth and add insight
into the relationship between, and behavior of these groups.
The view will proceed from the most general to the more spe-
cific. Steffy and Cromwell deal with the larger group of
"process schizophrenics"; whereas Shakow, with hindsight and
a command of analytic theory makes a finer distinction in
describing paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenia. The in-
formation which both provide can be augmented and extended
by the present results and observations. From this position
future directions can be suggested.
Steffy and Cromwell (1975) in reviewing their own re-
search and Shakow' s research and theory before 1975, con-
clude that task features which one would intuitively expect
to improve performance— e.g., regularity, intensity of sig-
nals, etc.— sometimes have the opposite effect on schizophre
nic performance. They state that:
.the various features of the task which con-
stitute signals to" the subject have a generally
impairing influence on schizophrenic performance
.the mechanism is not clear (p. 33-3^ )
-
In suggesting a "low order" theoretical inference
they
conclude:
.
the demands of an exacting vigilance demand-
^3
ing task provokes a level of stress which exceeds
the coping capacity of schizophrenics—particular-
ly the process schizophrenics.
. .if the subject
can predict the moment of performance demand or
even believe he can—the task may become more
stress inducing. Hence, the regular trials have
greater excitatory potential, which in turn may re-
quire greater coping responses. Similarly the
presence of other signals—although presenting more
information—may present greater task demands, and
consequently increase stress to the schizophrenic
(p. 34).
Shakow (1977) following upon 30+ years of research, and
with a strong background in analytic theory, has concluded
that paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics, particularly
the hebephrenic, exemplify the extremes of bipolar behavior
which characterizes inappropriate coping efforts in schizo-
phrenia. The nonparanoid, "hebephrenic views things in a
superficial, simplified overcontentual
,
confused, and loose
way, the paranoid views things in an overly specified, com-
plex, over-organized, and rigid way (p. 130). Normal behav-
ior, according to Shakow, reflects a generalized or major
set which disposes people to perceive and response to a sit-
uation objectively and autonomously; there is an integration
of the cognitive, affective and conative aspect of behavior.
Segmental sets, on the other hand, reflect the behavior of
schizophrenics and involve a preparatory adjustment which is
directed to portions of the stimulus situation. Schizophre-
nics, according to Shakow, attempt to change the environment
to establish safe conditions for gratification.
Looking back over these observations from the perspec-
tive of this experiment it might be expected that the ex-
citatory potential of a situation, which Steffy and Cromwell
discuss, differs for paranoid and nonparanoid schizophre-
nics. Regularity and the resultant stress is a problem
which sometimes causes nonparanoid schizophrenics to with-
draw from the environment and become more "cognitive";
whereas for paranoid schizophrenics irregularity produces
this effect. Prom the present results it also seems safe to
say that the bipolarity which Shakow points out exists in
relationship to some situations rather than being purely
"dispositional" (my quotes). In other words, whether the
nonparanoid "views things in a superficial, simplified over-
contentual, confused, and loose way" or more like a "normal"
subject with a more general set; and whether "the paranoid
views things In an overly specific, complex, over-organized,
and rigid way" or more like a "normal" subject with a more
general set depends at least in part upon the situation they
are behaving, or interacting, within. The effects of their
relationship to the situation determine to some extent whe-
ther the paranoid or nonparanoid will be "perceptual" and
"attentive" to the environment or "withdrawn" and "cogni-
tive."
"Schizophrenic" behavior, or any other kind of behavior
can take place within a situation which can be controlled
and defined in limited ways, and at the same time within an-
other situation in relationship to the experimenter, and
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within another situation in relationship to the hospital,
etc. Most importantly, the individual or the group, with a
particular disposition or dispositions, is acting in rela-
tionship and their behavior differs depending on the situa-
tion(s) they are within. A schizophrenic behaves more or
less in a paranoid or nonparanoid way depending on what they
are faced with.
Future research using the present model or some varia-
tion could take a number of directions. It is capable in a
limited way of determining whether the individual is "in-
sync"
1
or "out-of-sync" with what is going on around him/her
by utilizing psychophysiological measures in parallel with
video tape, for example. Larger groups and more varied
tasks and situations, both "controlled" and in vivo, using
standard lab equipment or telemetry devices and video tape
will offer a more "objective" picture of the state of rela-
tionship in schizophrenia. The work of the Laceys, Obrist
,
their colleagues and others carrying out psychophysiological
research has provided some information regarding the rela-
tionship of psychological and physiological behavior. This
work, together with skilled, self-aware observations of in-
dividuals within situations and relationships etc., would
offer a more holistic perspective on schizophrenia.
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TABLE 1
Symptom Rating Scale Data
Min Max Range Mean SD
Nonparanoid It ems
Controls 5 .
0
Nonparanolds 12 .
Paranoid Schizo-
phrenic s 5.0
Paranoid Schizophrenic Items
Controls 5.0
Nonparanolds 5 . 0
Paranoid Schizo-
phrenics 12 .
7.0 2.0 5.28 0.75
16.0 4.0 13.85 1.77
7.0 2.0 5.42 0.79
10. 0 5.0 6.14 1.86
8.0 3.0 6.57 1.27
20.0 8.0 14.57 3.15
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TABLE 2
Subj ect Characteristic s of Experimental
and Control Groups
Group
Variable Control Nonparanoid Paranoid F
Age
:
M
SD
25.71
7.95
21.57
3 . 20
30.14
-i r\ T C\10 . 1 0
N. S.
Number of Admissions:
M
SD
2 .00
1. 00
3.43
o R ft2 . o o
3.14
1 £ 71 • P /
N. S .
i
Total Weeks in Hospital
:
M
SD
4.85
2.41
32.00
46. 59
—
,
ill
2 3 . l ^
28.49
JM .
oO .
Ever Married:
M
SD
1.85
1.60
1.14
0.37
1.28
0.75
N., S.
Medicat ion*
:
M
SD
3.57
9.44
729.00
740.18
350. 00
295.80
P < M
Note: N = 7 for each group.
*In rng/day chloropronazine equivalent.
TABLE 3
Repeated Measures ANOVA for Heart Rate
o V SS DF
•
MS F Prob.
Groups 141060. 80 2 70530. 40 1
.
36 28
error 931398. 98 18 51744. 38
Conditions 4019. 44 5 803. 88 4. 58 . 001
Conditions x Groups 3223. 83 10 322. 38 1. 83 . 065
error 15777. 03 90 175. 30
Blocks 113. 19 2 56. 59 1. 19 • 313
Blocks x Groups 267. 30 4 66. 82 1. 41 .248
.error 1698. 13 36 47. 17
Conditions x Bloc ks 202. 78 10 20. 27 1. 54 .128
Conditions x Blocks
x Groups 539. 89 20 26. 99 2. 05 .007
error 2366. 07 180 13. 14
If 9
1 . 20-
1.00"
.80—1
.60
—
,40—
K +.20—1
u
eg
ABSOLUTE VALUES
Trial Warning Reaction Time
Basal Signal Signal
Controls
Paranoids
Nonparanoids
77.90 78.30
86.55 86.38
90.24 90.34
77.75
86.78-
89 - 64-
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Figure 1. Variable interval overall: . average of conditions
1 and 3.
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90.90 90.93
78.90
87.40
89.86«
Trial
Basal
Trial Basal to
Warning Signal
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Reaction Time Signal
Figure 2. Condition 3: variable preparatory interval 4, 5,
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Figure 3. Condition 5: variable preparatory interval 4, 5,
and 6 with four additional lights at one second
intervals following the warning signal.
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Figure 4. Fixed interval overall; conditions 1, 2, 4, and 6
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Figure 5. Condition 1: fixed preparatory interval 5.
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Figure 6. Condition 4; fixed preparatory interval 5 with four
additional lights at one second intervals following
the warning signal.
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Figure 8. Condition 6: fixed preparatory interval with an addi
tional 25 watt preen light as a second reaction time
signa 1 placed adjacent to the original reaction time
.signal between the original warning signal and reac-
tion time signals.
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Figure 9. Overall conditions.
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Figure 10. Average of conditions 1 and 4, fixed interval; 3
and 5, variable interval.
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Appendix 1
Does he tend to suspect or believe on slight evidence
or without good reason that people and external forces
are trying to or now do influence his behavior
control his thinking?
1
—No unjustified suspicions
'd—Will admit suspicion when pressed
3
—
Easily admits suspicion
4
—
Openly states others are trying to control him
5
—
Has firm conviction that he is influenced or con-
trolled
Does he have perceptions (auditory, visual) without
normal external stimulus correspondence?
1
—None
2
—When pressed admits hallucinations
3
—Easily admits haHue inations
H—Openly admits frequent hallucinations
5—Openly halluc inates
Does he tend to suspect or to believe on slight evi-
dence or without good reason that some people are
against him ( persecuting, conspiring, cheating
,
depriv-
ing, punishing) in various ways?
1—No unjust! fied suspicions expressed
2—
-When pressed expresses belief that he is conspired
3—Frequent ly inclined to suspect-
A --Frank inclination to believe in persecution
5—Strongly expresses conviction of persecution
On the basis of the integration of the verbal produc-
tions of the patient, does he exhibit thought processes
which are confused , disconnected or disorganized?
1—As normal
2— -Slight disorganization
3—Mild disorganization
L\
—Marked disorganization
5—Complete disorganization
Does he have an exaggeratedly high opinion of himself
or an unjustified belief or conviction of having unus-
ual ability, knowledge, power, wealth or status?
60
1
—No expressed high opinion of himself
2
—When pressed expresses a high opinion of himself
3
—Frequently expresses a high opinion of himself
k—Open conviction of unusual power, wealth, etc.
5--Strongly expresses conviction of grandiose or fantas-
tic power, wealth, etc
,
How incongruous are his emotional responses? e.g.,
giggling or crying for no apparent reason or not show-
ing any emotion when emotion would be appropriately
shown
.
1—As normal
2—Slightly different from normal
3—Responses somewhat incongruous
k—Distinctly incongruous
5—Very markedly incongruous
Does he tend to suspect or beli'eve on slight evidence
or without good reason that some people talk about,
refer to or watch him?
1—No unjustified suspicions
2—Will admit suspicion
3— -Easily admits suspicion
l\
—Openly states that he is watched
5—Has firm conviction of being watched
How well oriented is he as to time? For instance, does
he know (a) the season; (b) the month; (c) the calendar
year; (d) the day of the week; (e) how long he has been
in hospital?
1—As normal
2—Occasional confusion
3—Slight confusion
l\
—Frequent confusion
5 Marked continuous confusion
Compared to others how openly hostile is he? Does he
show hostility or a high degree of ill will, resentmen.,
bitterness or hate?
1—,No open hostility
2—Relatively little hostility
3—Some hostility
i\
—Rather hostile
5—Very hostile
Does he assume or maintain peculiar,
unnatural, or bi-
zarre postures?
61
1
—None
2
—On rare occasions
3—-For short periods
4
—-Frequent ly
5—All the time
11. How well is he able to describe, events leading up to
his present hospitalization? Does he know (a) that he
is in a hospital; (b) why he was admitted?
1—As normal
2—Somet imes makes errors
3—Slight confusion
^--Very muddled
5—Completely confused
DIRECTIONS FOR HEART RATE
—
REACTION TIME TASK
NOW, WHILE WE'RE CHECKING YOUR HEART RATE, I WANT TO
SEE HOW FAST YOU ARE. IN FRONT OF YOU IS A PANEL WITH A
NUMBER OF LIGHTS ON IT (E INDICATES LIGHTS) AND HERE (BY S-s
RIGHT OR LEFT HAND) IS A KEY FOR YOU TO PRESS DOWN. YOUR
JUb WILL BE TO PRESS DOWN THIS KEY AS FAST AS YOU CAN AS
SOON AS THIS GREEN LIGHT COMES ON. A COUPLE OF SECONDS BE-
FORE THE GREEN LIGHT COMES ON THIS HELLOW LIGHT WILL GO ON
AND OFF ONCE. THAT MEANS THE GREEN LIGHT WILL BE COMING ON
IN A VERY SHORT TIME. THE GREEN LIGHT WILL STAY ON UNTIL
YOU PRESS THIS KEY DOWN— SO WHEN YOU SEE THE GREEN LIGHT
COME ON PRESS THIS KEY DOWN WITH YOUR FINGER AS FAST AS YOU
CAN. SOMETIMES THESE OTHER LIGHTS WILL COME ON AND GO OFF
ALSO. WHEN THIS HAPPENS YOUR JOB WILL STILL BE TO PRESS THE
KEY DOWN AS FAST AS YOU CAN WHEN THE GREEN LIGHT COMES ON.
ANY QUESTIONS? OK, NOW WE'LL BEGIN. REMEMBER, THIS YELLOW
LIGHT WILL COME ON VERY BRIEFLY AND THEN SOON AFTER THAT THE
GREEN LIGHT WILL COME ON AND YOU'RE TO PRESS THIS KEY DOWN
WITH YOUR FINGER AS SOON AS THE GREEN LIGHT COMES ON.
NOW A GREEN LIGHT WILL ALSO COME ON BEHIND THE WINDOW IN THE
CENTER OF THE PANEL. JUST AS BEFORE THE YELLOW LIGHT WILL
WARN YOU THAT THE GREEN LIGHT BEHIND THE WINDOW WILL BE COM-
ING ON SOON. REST YOUR FINGER LIGHTLY ON THE LEVER AGAIN
AND WHEN YOU SEE THE GREEN LIGHT COME ON PRESS THE LEVER
DOWN WITH YOUR FINGER AS QUICKLY AS YOU CAN. WATCH CLOSELY
NOW
.
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